INTRODUCTION
THE MAIN PURPOSE of this paper is to provide an axiomatic approach to marginal cost (MC) pricing and to point out its similarity with Aumann-Shapley (A-S) pricing. The latter is a cost-sharing price mechanism discussed in [3 and 6] that is derived from a set of five natural axioms.
In this paper we consider models in which there is one producer with a given technology who faces fixed input prices and produces a finite number of consumption goods. Thus, we can uniquely derive the cost function that describes the minimal cost of producing a given vector of consumption goods.
By a price mechanism P(., ) we mean a rule or a function that associates with each cost function F and vector a of quantities, a vector of prices: P(F, a) = (PI(F, a), P2(F, a), . .. , Pm(F, a)), where m is the dimension of a and Pi(F, a) is the price of a unit of the ith commodity.
We shall consider price mechanisms which obey the following four axioms. First we require that prices should be independent of the units of measurement (Axiom 1). This is a fundamental requirement of any pricing system. We also require that the price of a commodity for which the cost function is nondecreasing be nonnegative (Axiom 4). Axiom 2 requires that two commodities having the same effect on the cost have the same price. This emphasizes the fact that the price of a commodity measures its "real value" in production.
Finally Axiom 3 enables us to calculate the prices via its factors of production: if the cost is broken into two (additive) factors, e.g., the cost of labor and the cost of raw materials, then the prices can be obtained by adding the prices attributable to the two factors separately. (In Section 4 we will show that Axiom 3 can be replaced by two other natural axioms.)
In this paper we prove that by strengthening the positivity axiom slightly (Axiom 4*), the four axioms (1,2,3, and 4*) uniquely characterize MC prices I We would like to thank Maurice Marchand, David Schmeidler, and Andras Simonovits for useful discussions. The support provided by the NSF through Grants SOC-77-27340 and SOC-79-05900 proved indispensable for the completion of this research.
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(Theorem B). On the way to proving this result we state a theorem (Theorem A) that is interesting in its own right. It characterizes the set of all price mechanisms satisfying the four "basic" axioms: 1,2,3, and 4. Among them are the marginal cost and the Aumann-Shapley price mechanisms. The latter as mentioned earlier, can be uniquely characterized by an additional requirement that cost equal revenue, i.e., cost is shared by the prices. This price mechanism was first proposed by Billera, Heath, and Raanan [2] to set telephone billing rates which would allocate the cost arising in serving the consumers; and it has been adopted for internal telephone billing at Cornell University. Later it was characterized axiomatically (independently) by Billera-Heath [3] and Mirman-Tauman [6] . Using Theorem A one can easily prove (Theorem C) that the A-S price mechanism is the unique cost-sharing mechanism which obeys Axioms 1-4. This provides an alternative proof for the main results in [3 and 6] .
To sum up, Axioms 1-4 are the key axioms in our study. Both MC prices and A-S prices obey them; moreover, strengthening Axiom 4 yields MC prices, while adding the cost-sharing requirement yields A-S prices.
Finally, we should mention that our work stems from ideas developed in game theory. In [2] it is shown that for a given cost function F and vector a of quantities, one can associate a nonatomic game v(F,a) so that its AumannShapley value measures the effect of each unit of each commodity on the cost. If this magnitude is chosen to be the price of the commodity we get exactly the Aumann-Shapley price mechanism. However, from the same game v(F, a) one can derive a price mechanism using, instead of the Aumann-Shapley value, a wider solution concept called the semi-value. Using the characterization of Dubey, Neyman, and Weber [5] for all semi-values of a large space of nonatomic games, it turns out that the corresponding set of price mechanisms derived from the set of all semi-values is exactly the set of all price mechanisms obeying Axiom 1-Axiom 4. Thus our Theorem A should be considered as the parallel result of Dubey, Neyman, and Weber formulated in purely economic terms.
THE AXIOMATIC APPROACH
We define the notion of a price mechanism and present four axioms by which we describe desirable mechanisms; then we characterize the set of all price mechanisms that satisfy these axioms. A price mechanism can lead to a profit as well as to a loss for the producer. However, how the profit is shared or how the loss is covered will not be discussed.
We denote by Em the m-dimensional Euclidean space, by E+m the nonnegative orthant of Em, and by E m? the positive orthant of Em.
Let C' be the set of all real-valued functions F which are defined on E' which satisfy F(O) = 0, and which are continuously differentiable on Em, where m is the number of commodities. A producer is characterized by a cost function2 21t is worth mentioning that for the results obtained in this section it is enough to consider only nondecreasing cost functions. We will characterize those price mechanisms which satisfy the following four axioms. The first axiom requires that the prices should be independent of the units of measurement. To illustrate it, suppose that F is a cost function of a producer who produces one commodity only. F(x) is the cost of producing x units of this commodity. Assume that x is measured in kilograms. Let G(y) be the cost function of the same producer where y is measured now in tons. Clearly
G(y) = F(lOOOy).
According to our notations, if a tons are produced the price per one ton is P(G, a). Since a tons are lOOOI a kg the price per kg is P(F, lOOOa). Therefore, a price mechanism P(., *) which obeys the rescaling axiom should have the property that P(G, a) = 1000 * P(F, lOOOa); The next axiom reflects the requirement that two commodities that are the "same" should have the same price. Since by definition a price mechanism yields prices that depend on the cost function and not on demand functions it is clear that being the "same commodity" means playing the same role in the cost function. As an illustration, consider someone who produces red and blue cars. He can represent his cost function as a two-variable function F(x1,x2) where xl and x2 are the quantities of red and blue cars respectively. But in fact, the cost of producing a red car is the same as the cost of producing a blue car. This can be formulated in the following way. There is a one-variable function G for which G(x) is the cost of producing a total of x cars (red ones, blue ones, or both) and In this case the axiom asserts that the price of a blue car is the same as the price of a red car, which is the price of a car, i.e., P1(F, (a ,a2)) = P2(F, (a1, a2)) = P(G,a1 + a2).
In general the following should hold: Pi(F, a) = X (ta) dp (t) (i=l,...,m).
Moreover, for a given price mechanism P(, ) there is a unique measure ti which satisfies (*). In other words, (*) defines a one-to-one mapping from the set of all nonnegative measures on ([O, 1], 6) onto the set of all price mechanisms obeying Axioms 1-4.
For an intuitive interpretation of the formula (*), assume that the vector a is produced in an homogenous way, starting from 0 and ending at a. Suppose also that along this production process each time a "small" proportion (an infinitesimal one) of a is produced, the mth commodity is then charged its current marginal production cost. The price of the mth commodity, once a has been produced, will be the average of these marginal costs weighted by the measure ti which corresponds to the given price mechanism. If this measure happens to be the atomic probability measure whose whole mass is concentrated at the point, t = 1, i.e., if ti({ 1}) = 1, the associated price mechanism P(., ) is the well-known marginal cost price mechanism. For any m, for any 
